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Abstract 
A risk assessment model has been developed in the form of a checksheet using a risk 
ranking system to assess the fire risk of buildings in terms of life safety. This involves 
a simple points system which assigns scores to various hazard and protection features 
of a building. These scores are then manipulated using addition and multiplication to 
arrive at an overall risk score for the building. The final value which represents the 
risk of the building is obtained using the definition of risk where risk is equal to the 
product of the likelihood of a fire occurring and its consequences. The proposed 
model which focuses on risk in terms of life safety can be extended to include 
property protection, environmental impact and social impact. It was found that the 
influences that human behaviour has on the fire risk within a building are significant 
and very difficult to quantify. 
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1. Introduction 
1. 1 Objective 
This project has been developed for the New Zealand Fire Service to assess the fire 
risks associated with a building. The purpose of this project has been to develop a 
system which identifies hazards within a building and the risks associated with those 
hazards. The end product is a checksheet which fire fighters can fill out while walking 
through a building. The checksheet attempts to convert the processes that a fire 
fighter uses when assessing a building for fire risk into a form that can be used by 
persons with less experience. 
The end product of the checksheet will be a number representing the fire risk in terms 
of life safety of the particular building under assessment. When compared with other 
buildings that have been assessed using the same system a relative risk scale will be 
the result. The fire risk of a building will only be relative to other buildings that have 
been assessed. This will identify which buildings are of a high risk to life safety in a 
local district. 
1.2 Uses for Model 
1.2.1 Fire Service Resource Allocation 
A risk assessment model which results in the quantification of the fire risk in a 
building can be of much use to the Fire Service. By assessing the fire risk of buildings 
in an area, a hazard map can be developed showing up all the high risk areas and 
concentrated problem areas. This can be achieved by taking the results of the model 
and laying them out in a map of the district. The different results could be displayed 
as different colours or as numbers, or on a computer database system. 
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Mapping the fire risk areas provides knowledge of where the high and low fire hazard 
areas are assuming that the model used gives reasonable results. This can ultimately 
lead to the improved allocation of fire fighting resources within the Fire Service on a 
local, regional or national scale. Also the results of the fire risk assessment model 
could be useful in reassessing the optimum number of fire stations in a district and 
their best locations so as to meet the level of hazard associated with a local area. 
1.2.2 Fire Engineers 
There is potential for this model to be used by fire engmeers to identify which 
components of a building make it unsafe. The fire engineer can use the assessment to 
see which parts of the building cause the risk ranking to be low or high. This could be 
useful when needing to rapidly identify hazards in buildings. Fire engineers can also 
reassess a building after an upgrade of the fire safety. This would show how much 
less fire risk there was in terms oflife safety. 
1.2.3 Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies assess premiums based on risks. This model could be used to 
enable insurance companies to assess the fire risks associated with a building. This 
model investigates the fire risks of a building in terms of only life safety. In the future 
it can be further developed to look at fire risks associated with property protection. 
At this further development stage this model would probably be more interest for 
insurance companies because property protection is the major concern for building 
insurance. 
1.2.4 Building Inspectors 
In the future this model could form part of a quality standard which buildings must 
comply to for fire safety approval. There is therefore a potential for building 
3 
inspectors to be able to use this model to assess buildings to see that they meet certain 
quality standards. 
4 
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2. Hazard and Risk 
2.1 Definitions 
In developing a system that can be used to assess the risks and hazards associated 
with a particular complex or building it is important to have an understanding of the 
terminology used. Defining the terms "risk" and "hazard" helps to keep the problem 
at hand in focus. It also emphasises the difficulty in quantifying risk and hazard. 
Once one has an understanding of what fire risk and fire hazard is, progress can be 
made toward developing a model which can assess the 'amount' of potential danger in 
a building. 
Risk and hazard have a variety of definitions which all tend toward the same meaning. 
This project deals with fire risk and fire hazard definitions found in the Fire Service 
dictionary (Narayanan, 1996). 
Risk is defined as the likelihood of occurrence that will have an impact upon 
objectives. It is the product ofthe consequences and likelihood. 
RISK = frequency of event * consequence. 
Hazard is defined as an object or physical situation with a potential for causing harm 
to life, health or property. 
Fire risk is defined as the probability that a fire, which has impact on life, health or 
property, will occur. 
Fire hazard is defined as fire that has the potential for causing harm to life health or 
property. 
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2.2 Hazard Versus Risk 
It is necessary to have a clear view of the difference between hazard and risk. 
A hazard is an object or situation with the potential to do harm. A hazard exists or it 
does not. Its existence is factual, not a matter of interpretation. 
Risk on the other hand, is the probability that a particular hazard will cause harm. 
The magnitude of the risk is related to the harm done, ie., how many people are killed 
or injured, what environmental damage is done, what are the costs in terms of damage 
to plant, lost production time, the need to employ temporary staff, a reduction in 
workforce or public credibility, or legal proceedings and increased insurance 
premiums (Klein 1996). 
There can be much confusion between risk and hazard. Many think that risk is the 
probability of an occurrence and that hazard is the consequence. This is incorrect. 
The risk is a combination of the probability of an occurrence and it's consequence. 
An event which has a low probability of occurring but has a significant consequence 
may have a similar risk as an event which happens frequently but with small 
consequences. Therefore to quantify risk, the probability of an event occurring must 
be combined with its consequences otherwise it will have no real meaning in terms of 
the size of the risk. The hazard however is a situation with the potential for causing 
harm with no consideration of how often the situation occurs. 
As an example, an oil refinery would be classified as a high hazard premises due to the 
likely severity of a fire occurring therein but in reality would be a low risk, as 
historical data would show that risk management activities make it unlikely that a fire 
will actually occur (NSWFB). 
It is difficult to talk about risk and hazard without knowing about the circumstances 
involved. So far the discussion on risk has just involved two components, probability 
and consequences. The magnitude of risk relates to these two components. However 
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the perception of risk relates to its context. The consequences of a fire are different 
depending upon'the context from which it is viewed. For example the consequences 
of a fire vary when viewed from the following contexts: 
Life safety 
Property protection 
Environmental impact 
Social impact 
When assessing a building in terms of life safety, there is a great concern for the 
people in the building. What they are doing, how many of them are present, are they 
asleep or awake. These factors all make a difference to the risk which the occupants 
are susceptible to. 
If assessing a building in terms of property protection, such factors as the building 
materials, how large the building is and what items are inside it become more 
important. 
When considering the fire risk of a building in terms of environmental impact factors 
such as the potential smoke production into the atmosphere and the toxic water runoff 
from firefighting become important issues. 
If assessing the fire risk of a building in terms of social impact there is concern for the 
role of the building in the community. There would need to be consideration as to 
whether the loss of that building or the items within it by fire would have an impact on 
society. If so the magnitude of the impact would need to be assessed. 
The assessment of the fire risk in a building depends on the circumstances of a 
potential fire scenario and the context within which the risk is being assessed. 
8 
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3. Review of Existing Models 
The following risk assessment models that have been reviewed are all risk ranking 
models. A risk ranking model attempts to rank a building by assigning scores to 
particular features of the building and then manipulating those scores by some 
arithmetic function to give a final risk score for the building. 
3.1 Gretner Method 
M. Gretner of the Swiss Fire Prevention Service began to study the possibility of an 
arithmetical evaluation of fire risk in buildings in 1960. He developed a model which 
uses the explicit concept of risk as the expectation of loss given by the product of 
hazard probability and hazard severity(Watts 1995). It is based on the following 
simple formula. 
R=AxB 
Where 
R =fire risk 
A = probability that a fire will start, and 
B =fire hazard, degree of danger, or severity. 
The Gretner method is based on these two probabilities. The fire hazard is calculated 
as a ratio of the potential hazard to the protective measures rather than a sum. 
B = P/(N x S x F) 
Where 
B = fire hazard 
P = potential hazard 
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N = standard fire safety measures 
S = special measures, and 
F = fire resistance of the building 
Potential hazard, P, is the product of hazard elements whose magnitudes are 
influenced on the one hand by the building contents, ie., materials and merchandise 
present, and on the other hand, by the building itself. 
As with most other schedule approaches, the values for these individual factors are 
not based on statistics, but are empirical figures resulting from a comparison of 
analyses of fire risks for which fire protection measures are either common or required 
by law (Watts 1995). 
This model requires values for five different factors, those being A, P, N, S and F as 
defined above. To obtain values for A, the probability that a fire will start and B, the 
fire hazard is quite a task when trying to deal with little or no statistical data. Trying 
to assign values to the standard fire safety measures and also special measures and 
also differentiate between the two is difficult. Also, quantifying the fire resistance of a 
building is difficult. Therefore the Gretner method is felt to be too complicated to 
apply to in this situation. There is a range of factors to be dealt with and it is felt that 
it would be very time consuming and difficult to deal with all the factors so that they 
would be suitable in a large variety of different buildings. For these reasons the 
Gretner method has not been used here. 
3.2 Dow's Fire and Explosion Index 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index is a risk assessment model designed specifically 
for the Dow Chemical Company. This model "is a useful screening tool to quantify 
the expected damage from potential fire, explosion and reactivity incidents and to 
identify equipment that could likely contribute to the creation or escalation of an 
incident" (Watts, 1995). 
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It is very specific towards the chemical industry and there is much emphasis on 
explosions and reactions. "The key feature of the method is to identify the dominant 
combustible material in the unit being studied and assess its thermodynamic 
properties" (Watts, 1995). 
The method then calculates hazard factors, material factors and then damage factors. 
The methods of calculating the risks of the identified hazards are representative of a 
risk ranking system. This model was found to be useful in that it uses a method of 
assigning values to various variables depending on their dominance within the 
building. 
3.3 Australian Fire Service 
Two models were reviewed from Australia. They were the New South Wales Fire 
Service Risk Mapping Classification System and also the Queensland Mapping 
System (NSWFB). Both models use a checksheet which a firefighter would fill out 
while assessing the building. They take into consideration the number of stories a 
building has, it's floor area and the construction materials of the building. Also, 
building age into consideration and whether or not it has fire protection systems in 
place. 
Both models use the risk ranking technique of assigning a score to various categories 
of the building features.. The scores are then summed at the end to give a resultant 
risk value for the building. Appendix 1 shows copies of the Australian models 
reviewed. 
There is no explanations available as to why the various categories are used, where 
the assigned values came from or what they are based on. Both the models have used 
subjective judgement to develop the numbers used but have not described the 
reasoning behind those choices. 
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In developing a model for life safety, one would need to consider the occupants in the 
building. Both these Australian models have briefly considered occupants. The only 
allowance for occupants in a building is an occupant hazard category. This allows the 
occupants to come under low, medium or high categories. The category is chosen 
from a list of building occupancies which list only the types of building, eg., laundries, 
leather goods factories, railway sheds, motels. There is no provision for the varying 
number of occupants or their age or capabilities. 
It is felt that a model which gives a building a risk ranking in terms of life safety 
should take more features into consideration to try and develop a more accurate 
estimation of the risks involved. There is of course an unlimited list of building 
features which can be considered which would be impossible to cover with one risk 
assessment model. . However the Australian models which have been reviewed do not 
consider the potential for a fire to start, its growth potential or the detailed 
characteristics of the building's occupants. 
3.4 Rapid Fire Risk Assessment 
Gillet, 1994 discusses a model called Rapid Fire Risk Assessment. This model has a 
different format to that previously mentioned. The user follows through a series of 
tables and selects the appropriate boxes and assigns the corresponding score which is 
given at the bottom of the table. At the end the scores are combined and the user 
ends up with two scores. One relates to the likelihood of fire and the other to the 
severity of the consequences. The likelihood of fire table is shown below in Table 3-
1. The consequences table is shown below in Table 3-2. 
SIMPLE FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT LIKELillOOD 
Factor High Nonnal 
Fire Load 
Likelihood of 
Ignition 
Likelihood of 
Escalation 
Block likelihood total mark 
= 
Score High = 3 
Normal= 2 
Low= 1 
Low Not Sure Score 
Not sure = 2 on Ignition and Escalation 
Not sure= 3 on Fire Load 
Table 3-1 Simple Fire Risk Assessment Likelihood 
SIMPLE FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT CONSEQUENCES 
Factor High Nonnal 
Harm to 
people 
Harm to 
environment 
Harm to 
buildings and 
equipment 
Harm to 
business 
Block likelihood total mark 
= 
Score High = 3 
Normal= 2 
Low= 1 
Low Score 
Table 3-2 Simple Fire Risk Assessment Consequences 
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These two scores are looked up in a final table and a single final number is given. 
This number is between one and ten. The higher the number, the more severe the fire 
risk. This final table is shown as Table 3-3. 
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SEVERITY OF 
CONSEQUENCES 
Very Severe 
Severe 
Moderate 
Slight 
Very Slight 
6 
5 
3 
2 
1 
8 
7 
5 
4 
2 
9 10 10 
8 9 10 
7 8 9 
5 7 8 
3 5 6 
Very Low Normal High Very 
Low High 
LIKELffiOOD 
Table 3-3 "Rapid Fire Risk Assessment" consequences versus likelihood matrix. 
This model was found very useful however and some of the concepts have been used 
in the development of the new model. For instance the method of combining the 
ignition sources and flammable materials has been used. This is very simplistic but 
effective in obtaining a rapid assessment of the fire risk of a building using little 
information and no statistical data. It works through the various features of a building 
and ranks them as high medium or low according to their relative influence on the 
safety of a building. This is simple but better than nothing at identifying hazards and 
their associated risks. 
This model is said to be used effectively by some professionals and judged credible by 
peer review. However the methods used are not very precise. There is little 
consideration to the number and type of occupants, or what fuel loading is involved. 
There is no explanation of the methods used in developing the tables in the model or 
the justification of the scores assigned to them. 
3.5 Summary 
These models which have been reviewed have all been useful in the development of a 
new model. They all use the risk ranking technique as the best way of obtaining a 
15 
quick fire risk assessment with the limited data that is available. The reviewed models 
have not been used for the purposes of this project for a variety of reasons. Either 
they are too specific in their intended purpose to be suitable or too brief in detail. 
For these reasons a new model has been developed to meet the objectives of this 
project. Some of the methods from the models reviewed have been incorporated in 
this new model as they were found to be useful in terms of risk assessment of 
buildings. 
16 
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4. Model Development 
4.1 Risk Ranking Systems 
The model being developed is a fire risk ranking system. Using professional 
judgement and past experience, fire risk ranking assigns values to selected variables 
representing both positive and negative fire safety features. The selected variables 
and assigned values are then operated on by some combination of arithmetic functions 
to arrive at a single value, which is then compared to other similar assessments or to a 
standard (Watts, 1995). 
The model is arranged so that credits are assigned to each of the hazard features and 
charges assigned to the protection features. The user works through a checksheet and 
ticks the appropriate boxes. After the checksheet has been completed the positive 
credits and the negative charges are summed. This total which represents the 
magnitude of the hazards within the building is then multiplied by a number 
representing the probable fire severity. The probable fire severity is obtained by 
combining the likelihood of ignition with the fire growth rate of the materials present. 
There will be a resultant dimensionless number representing the fire risk in terms of 
life safety. 
4.2 Life Safety versus Total Risk 
As previously mentioned the risk associated with a building can vary widely 
depending on the perception of that risk, ie. the context in which it is viewed. The 
initial development of the model was to result in one number which gave the overall 
fire risk ofthe building being assessed. However it has since been discovered that it is 
very difficult to obtain an accurate number representing the risk in terms of life safety 
as well as in terms of property protection, environmental impact and social impact. 
These are very different issues and are affected by fire in different ways. For example 
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if considering life safety when developing a model it would be important to consider 
the number of occupants, any disabilities they may have, and the growth rate of fuel. 
One would not need to consider whether the runoff from water applied to the fire 
went into a stream and destroyed wildlife, nor would one need to consider how much 
property was lost in terms of money value. If the risk was being assessed in terms of 
environmental impact however then the runoff hazard would be an issue of more 
importance. The property loss would be of high importance if concerned about 
property protection. It is very difficult to lump all these issues together and come up 
with one overall number which represents all of them. 
For these reasons, the new model is focusing on identifying the positive and negative 
safety features of a building relating to life safety. 
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5. Factors Affecting Life Safety. 
The model includes the some of the following variables. These are discussed with the 
intention of giving the reader an understanding of the importance they have on life 
safety and whether they are included in the model or not. 
Probability of Fire 
Ignition probability 
-flammable substances present 
-ignition source eg. smoking 
Fire growth 
Fuel load 
Hazards and Related Consequences 
Occupants 
Number of occupants 
Aged, immobile or young occupants 
Sleeping people present 
Human behaviour 
Building 
Number of stories 
Quality of escape routes 
Building age 
Fire and smoke spread 
Floor area 
Hazardous substances 
Management Practices 
Housekeeping 
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Wedged open doors 
Evacuation procedures 
Evacuation drills 
Staff training 
Protection 
Sprinklers 
Smoke alarms 
Heat detectors 
Manual call points 
Brigade connection 
Management practices 
5.1 Probability of Fire 
Recalling the definition of risk from chapter 2, risk is the product of the probability of 
an event and its consequence. The factors presented in this section relating to fire 
make up the probability part of the risk model. When combined, these factors relate 
to the likelihood of a fire occurring. The sections following ie., Occupants, Building, 
Management Practices and Protection combine to form the hazards and their related 
consequences in the event of a fire. 
5.1.1 Ignition 
The likelihood of ignition relates to a combination of whether there is an ignition 
source and whether flammable materials are present. If there is an ignition source the 
likelihood of ignition also depends upon whether there is any controls in place or not. 
For instance a fireplace would be considered an ignition source. If there was a spark 
guard in place then any flammable materials have some protection against sparks 
which might cause ignition. The spark guard effectively reduces the likelihood of 
ignition. 
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Secondly the user must decide whether there are flammable materials present. If so 
are they near a potential ignition source. In the case of the fireplace, if the floor has a 
carpet covering then the likelihood of a spark igniting it is higher than if it were a bare 
wooden floor or a concrete floor. A stack of newspapers in front of the fireplace is 
even more hazardous. 
In deciding whether something is an ignition source the user of the model must judge 
it appropriately. Appliances and electrical devices are designed to certain safety 
standards and when being used for their intended purpose would not be considered as 
a likely ignition source. They are however sometimes faulty and can start fires. 
Appliances should be considered as a controlled ignition source. However in the case 
where a potential ignition source such a heater is being used to dry clothes the 
likelihood of ignition becomes much higher and would be considered an uncontrolled 
ignition source. 
Potential ignition sources in a building are often the results of human behaviour as in 
the last example. This is a difficult area to deal with. Objects in a building may have a 
low likelihood of ignition which is easily made high by the behaviour of one person. 
When assessing a building the user should try and deal with potential ignition sources 
as they are seen or as they are likely to be in the normal operation of the building. 
Human behaviour is discussed later. 
It is impossible to specify all of the situations which cause a high likelihood of 
ignition. The user must ask themselves whether there are ignition sources present. 
Then the user must decide if there are adequate flammable materials near by so that 
the combination of the ignition source and the adjacent flammable materials 
constitutes a significant hazard. This can be done with the help of Table 5-l which is 
taken from the Rapid Fire Risk Assessment model (Gillet, 1994). 
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Ignition Sources Flammable Materials Likelihood of Ignition 
Rarely Present Rarely Present Low 
Rarely Present Controlled Flammables Low 
Rarely Present Uncontrolled Flammables Medium 
Controlled Ignition Source Rarely Present Low 
Controlled Ignition Source Controlled Flammables Medium 
Controlled Ignition Source Uncontrolled Flammables High 
Uncontrolled Source Rarely Present Medium 
Uncontrolled Source Controlled Flammables High 
Uncontrolled Source Uncontrolled Flammables High 
Table 5-l Likelihood of Ignition Classifications 
The terms given in the table above are explained as follows. 
Ignition Source Rarely Present. 
This category is fairly self explanatory. If the building being assessed has no ignition 
sources when in normal use then this is the category to use. Almost all buildings have 
light fittings. For this model they are not considered as an ignition source. A 
bedroom containing a radio and an electric clock would come into this category. 
Controlled Ignition Source. 
This category applies to buildings containing ignition sources that are not likely to be 
a problem. This would include appliances, heaters, computers, fireplaces with a 
closing door. 
Uncontrolled Ignition Source. 
This category includes situations where there are open flames present such as lab 
Bunsen burners, open fire places, or flying sparks. Any other situation which the user 
deems as a likely ignition source would fall into this category. 
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Flammables Rarely Present. 
An area with virtually nothing to bum would fall into this category. A workshop 
containing objects such as tools and non flammable equipment would apply to this 
category. The user must assess the objects within the building and decide whether 
they are likely to bum if ignited. If the answer is no then this category would apply. 
Controlled Flammables. 
This category covers situations where flammable materials are present but they are 
not likely to easily ignite. This would include wooden furniture, filing cabinets, books 
on a bookshelf. Under certain conditions these items would bum but the likelihood is 
not high. 
Uncontrolled Flammables. 
This category covers buildings containing flammables which are likely to easily ignite. 
This would include loose papers, polyurethane foam covered furniture, curtains etc. 
If there are flammable materials close to an ignition source in an uncontrolled manner 
then they would come into this category. 
5.1.2 Fire Growth 
The growth rate of combustibles is important to life safety. Fast growing fires will 
produce smoke at a greater rate than slow growing fires. It is the smoke which is 
initially produced that is most important to life safety. A slow growing fire will 
produce low amounts of smoke initially giving occupants more time to escape. The 
concentrations of smoke that occupants breathe in may be lower than in a fast 
growing fire, thus reducing the likelihood of injury or death. 
The growth rate of the fire is split into four categories, slow, medium, fast and ultra 
fast. Based on the predominant fuels in the building and the way in which they are 
arranged the user will select the appropriate category. Table 5-2 gives the growth 
rate categories to be used. 
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Predominant Fuel 
Little or no fuel. Items which will rarely 
ignite or develop into fire. 
Objects which do not easily ignite but 
would burn given sufficient ignition. 
Items of metal or heavy wooden 
construction. Minimal plastics or foam. 
Tidy bookcases, filing cabinets. 
Typical bedroom or office rooms. 
Fire Growth Rate 
Slow 
Medium 
Loose papers, general furniture, curtains, Fast 
light wooden items, polyurethane foam 
coverings. 
High dominance of rapid burning objects. 
Items which produce high volumes of 
smoke rapidly. 
Storage of polyurethane covered 
furniture, plastics, foams, clothing. 
Table 5-2 Fire Growth Rate Classifications 
5.1.3 Fuel Load 
Ultra Fast 
Fuel load is not as important as the growth rate of the combustibles. Generally there 
will be enough combustibles to sustain a fire which could potential cause injury or 
death. Fuel load however is more of a concern to property protection. A building 
containing enough fuel to burn for days is significant to property loss. With life safety 
fire risk there only needs to be sufficient fuel to burn for a matter of minutes. For this 
hazard factor the user needs to ask, is there enough fuel present to sustain a fire that 
could compromise the lives of the people in the building. Usually the answer will be 
yes. In some cases it will be the opposite such as engineering workshops where there 
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may be little or no fuel. If this is the case then it will be detected by the model in the 
sections allowing for likelihood of ignition and fire gro-wth rate. Therefore there is no 
provision for the fuel load within a building in this model. 
5.2 Occupants 
5.2.1 Number of Occupants 
It is far easier to evacuate a building when there are few people occupying it than if it 
contains a large number of people. Hence there is a lesser risk of injury or death to 
occupants due to lack of delays and queuing. Also a low number of occupants in a 
building means a relatively low number of people exposed to the hazards in that 
building. The risk associated with the number of people occupying a building is 
divided into four categories. It is designed so that the higher the number of people at 
risk, the greater the corresponding risk value. The categories are as given in Table 5-
3. 
Number of Occupants Occupant Category 
Upto2 Low 
3 to 5 Medium 
6 to 20 High 
Over 20 Extreme 
Table 5-3 Occupant Number Classifications 
The first category is a low number of people at risk. This is up to 2 people. Society 
seems to tolerate a fire which results in one or two people being injured or killed in a 
fire. Where multiple deaths occur there is more interest from society. The 6 deaths 
resulting from the New Empire Hotel fire on the 4th February 1995 caused great 
upset to society. In the above table, the high classification incorporates buildings 
where between 6 and 20 people are present. The moderate classification is where a 
building contains 3 to 5 occupants. This number of people at risk is still quite low but 
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considered high enough that a category between low and high should exist. The 
extreme category of over 20 people is to take large groups of people into 
consideration. A fire resulting in the loss of more than 20 people is unlikely but 
would be considered a disaster by society. 
The number of occupants in a building is to be taken as the number of people who 
would normally occupy the building or the firecell during its intended use. 
5.2.2 Aged, Immobile or Young Occupants 
Aged persons are generally less mobile than the average person. They also have a 
higher tendency to have hearing problems. These factors can contribute· to problems 
in an emergency situation such as slower reactions to a fire and slower egress from 
the building. Research shows that fires in rest homes result in far greater deaths than 
any other building (Narayanan & Whiting, 1996). For this reason the model allows 
the user to note whether the building contains aged or immobile occupants. It is up to 
the user of the model to judge whether the age or the mobility condition of the 
occupants would cause delays in a fire situation which would increase the danger to 
the occupants. For example, rest homes and care institutions containing disabled 
people would be considered as buildings with increased risk to the occupants. 
The high number of deaths in rest home fires indicates that the risk to the occupants 
is significantly higher in the case of aged people. The increased risk to disabled or 
immobile people is also considered to be significant as mentioned by Shields, 1995. 
Buildings containing a high proportion of children is also considered to increase the 
risk. Very young children have difficulty perceiving that there is danger in a fire 
situation. When they do perceive danger they do not always react by trying to escape. 
Quite often children try to hide from the danger. Firefighters have been known to find 
children hiding behind furniture or hiding in closets. It is for these reasons that young 
children are considered a higher risk than adults. Buildings such as creches, 
kindergartens and other childcare institutions which have a high proportion of children 
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are the types of situations being referred to here. Schools and places where children 
have had some fire evacuation training are not considered to be an increased risk. This 
is because the children would be more able to perceive danger and if they have been 
trained to evacuate in a fire situation then they would know how to react. The user 
must assess the situation and decide if there is a high proportion of children present 
and if so whether they would cause significant delays in an emergency evacuation. 
A building containing a minority of aged or disabled people or children would not be 
considered to increase the danger to the occupants ifthere is a majority of able people 
present to assist. For instance, an office containing 10 people, 2 of which are aged, 
disabled, or children would not be considered a problem. As mentioned previously, it 
is up to the judgement of the user of the model to assess the potential danger. 
Aged, disabled occupants and children are accounted for in this model in Table 5-4. 
Aged, Disabled Occupants and Children Result 
Are aged, disabled or immobile persons or children present such 
that they would cause significant delays in an emergency Yes Bad 
evacuation? 
No Good 
Table 5-4 Aged, Disabled Occupants and Children Classification 
5.2.3 Sleeping Occupants 
In a building where the occupants may be sleeping such as hotels, apartments, 
hospitals, rest homes etc., the response time is expected to be longer in an emergency 
situation. Where there is an automatic detection system present, sleeping occupants 
take longer to respond to the alarm signal than if they are awake. The alarm firstly 
has to wake them from their sleep. The time to do this varies depending on the 
"heaviness" of the occupants' sleep. Those under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
may not wake to the sound of a fire alarm. Secondly, once awake, the occupants take 
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time to comprehend the alarm sound and realise that they have been woken by the 
alarm. They must then get out of bed and investigate the alarm before evacuating the 
building. All of this could take some time and will usually take significantly longer 
than if the occupants are awake at the time of the alarm. 
If there is no automatic alarm system the occupants may not wake up during a fire 
until it is too late. Noise of roaring flames or windows breaking may wake occupants 
but this also means that the fire is well developed and the egress route may be 
overwhelmed by fire and smoke. 
Whether occupants are sleeping or not can make a significant difference to the 
chances of them surviving in a fire. Early warning detection systems which sound an 
alarm also play an important role in the survival of sleeping occupants. Protection 
features of a building are discussed later. 
Sleeping occupants are accounted for in this model in Table 5-5. 
Sleeping Occupants Result 
Is this building intended for sleeping purposes or Yes Bad 
do the occupants of this building sleep here? No Good 
Table 5-5 Sleeping Occupants Classifications 
5.2.4 Behaviour of Occupants 
The behaviour of people can be the main cause of hazards in safe buildings. These 
behaviours are very difficult to quantify. There is an almost endless list of 
possibilities, for example: 
• Locking of fire exits at night clubs. 
• Drunk or drugged people cooking and leaving pots on the stove. 
• Falling asleep while smoking. 
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• Using heaters too close to flammables 
• Use of sparking equipment such as welders and grinders too close to flammables. 
These human factors are often the cause of fatalities within relatively low hazard 
buildings. These sorts of things are extremely difficult to assess with this type of 
model. Therefore there will be no provision for human behaviour in the checksheet. 
5.3 Building 
5.3.1 Number of Stories 
The number of stories a building makes a difference to the time needed for escape. It 
is obvious that a high rise building will involve more problems for occupants escaping 
that a single story building. A multi level building contains stairs which are used by 
occupants in an emergency. Even if the building had elevators, these are not to be 
used as a means of escape in the event of fire. 
For this reason there is a hazard factor relating to the number of stories the building 
has. A single story building has no stairs and will be in a separate category to those 
buildings with stairs. For this model a single story building with a mezzanine floor 
will be considered as a two level building. 
The hazard categories for the number of stories will be low, medium and high. They 
are divided as shown in Table 5-6. 
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Number of Levels Hazard Category 
Single Level Low 
2 to 4 Levels, includes mezzanine floors Medium 
5 or more Levels High 
Table 5-6 Number of Levels Classifications 
The low hazard category is for buildings of only one level. Here there are no stairs to 
other levels. The medium category is for buildings of 2 to 4 levels. This grouping has 
been used as an intermediate category. A building of 2 to 4 levels is a multi level 
building but is not considered as a high rise. Anything 5 levels and above is 
considered as a high hazard for this model. 
5.3.2 Exits 
The quality of exits of a building relates to their location, distribution and ease of use. 
With the help of Table 5-7 the user will assess the quality of the exits in the building. 
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Exit Assessment Exit Quality 
Do the occupants have an alternative means of egress in a Yes Good 
fire situation? 
No Bad 
Are there long or confusing exitways such that occupants Yes Bad 
would have difficulty escaping? 
No Good 
Does the building have a sufficient number of exits for the Yes Good 
size of the building and it's occupants? 
No Bad 
Table 5-7 Exit Quality Assessment 
The above table is designed to give the user flexibility when assessing the exits. The 
user is guided by the questions as to what to look for. The user must keep in mind 
the use of the building and the nature of the occupants. The main question being 
answered by using the above table is, "Are the exits adequate for the safe and efficient 
egress of occupants during an emergency?" 
5.3.3 Building Age 
This model attempts to take into account the factors which are hazards in a building. 
Often an old building will be more hazardous than a new one. This is because modern 
building codes require buildings to meet certain fire safety standards. Hazardous 
features of old buildings such as concealed spaces, open shafts, lack of fire stopping 
will be covered under the smoke and fire spread section. Therefore no provision will 
be made in this model for building age. 
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5.3.4 Fire and Smoke Spread 
The construction of a building can have a great influence on how smoke and fire can 
spread throughout a building. This section enables the user to assess the concealed 
spaces, open shafts and penetrations within a building with regard to their potential 
influence on life safety. When completing this part of the model the user should keep 
in mind whether the risk to occupants' lives could be affected by the various features 
of the building. This can be achieved with the help ofTable 5-8. 
Smoke and Fire Spread Assessment Result 
Do concealed spaces exist such that fire or smoke spread could Yes Bad 
occur within the building in the event of a fire? 
If so, are they likely to significantly increase the risk to 
occupants' lives? 
No Good 
Do open shafts exist such that fire or smoke spread could occur Yes Bad 
within the building in the event of a fire? 
If so, are they likely to significantly mcrease the risk to 
occupants' lives? 
No Good 
Do holes or penetrations exist such that fire or smoke spread Yes Bad 
could occur within the building in the event of a fire? 
If so, are they likely to significantly increase the risk to 
occupants' lives? 
No Good 
Table 5-8 Smoke and Fire Spread Classifications 
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5.3.5 Floor Area 
A building with a large floor area could be considered as more of a fire risk than one 
with a small floor area just because of the greater size. A large building could be 
considered more of a risk because it is probably likely to have more ignition sources 
than a smaller building of the same nature. Consider two office buildings. One twice 
the size of the other, both with similar contents and equipment. The larger office 
would probably have more computers, heaters and other potential ignition sources. 
For this reason it could be considered more of a fire risk. The larger office may also 
have more occupants. The occupant load of a building is covered previously. 
There are however reasons why a large building may be less of a fire risk than a small 
building. If the two office buildings mentioned above both have the same number of 
occupants then the larger building would have its occupants less densely spread out 
than the small building. Therefore there would be less chance of queuing to get out 
the door, hence less risk of being injured. It could be argued however that being in a 
small building would mean that occupants would become aware of the fire earlier than 
those in a large building and therefore could escape quicker. Also, occupants in a 
large building are not necessarily spread out evenly. Company meetings, group 
activities and crowd gatherings can easily form uneven concentrations of people. 
A large building would probably have more alternative exits than a small one therefore 
reducing the risk to life safety. On the other hand the distance one has to travel to 
escape may be much shorter for a smaller building therefore reducing the risk to life 
safety. These advantages and disadvantages of exits are covered earlier so will not 
play a part here. 
When considering a fire in a building with a large open floor area, it can be argued 
that the upper layer of heat and toxic smoke would descend slowly compared to a 
building with a small floor area. This is due to the upper layer being allowed to 
spread over a large area before hitting the walls and descending toward the floor. 
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However the height of the ceiling and the size of the rooms within a building are more 
important in terms of the descending smoke than the floor area of the whole building. 
There are both positive and negative features relating to the floor area of a building. 
They are difficult to quantify and compare. Such features of the differences in floor 
area are felt to have been covered reasonably in other sections mentioned previously. 
These features are such things as the quality of the exits, potential ignition sources, 
number of occupants. For these reasons there will not be a provision in the model 
allowing for the· floor area of a building. 
5.3.6 Hazardous Substances 
Some substances which are present in buildings can increase the fire risk to life safety. 
Stored chemicals that may give off highly toxic fumes, paints, explosives and certain 
gases can cause increased injuries in a fire situation. Where these items are present 
they should be incorporated into the model. The user must decide whether any of the 
items in the building are hazardous substances. 
Polyurethane and materials that have an ultra fast fire growth rate could be seen as 
being hazardous substances. These are covered in the section on fire growth rate so 
should not be considered as hazardous substances. 
Allowance for hazardous substances is shown in Table 5-9. 
Presence of Hazardous Substances Result 
Are hazardous substances present in the building which Yes Bad 
significantly increase the risk to life safety? No Good 
Table 5-9 Allowance for hazardous substances 
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5.4 Management Practices 
5.4.1 Housekeeping 
Housekeeping practices within a building can have an effect on the fire risk of a 
building in terms of life safety. For example the obstruction of exitways. If corridors 
and hallways contain stored equipment, boxes, furniture or other obstructions, these 
can be hazards in the event of an emergency. They may not seem like hazards in the 
everyday use of the building because they may be easy to avoid or walk around. 
However in an emergency there may be many people trying to egress the building 
through an exitway simultaneously and if it is cluttered with obstructions then delays 
are easily caused. These delays could be very critical if occupants are trying to 
evacuate a building which is on fire. For this reason the provision is made for the 
neatness of exitways as shown in Table 5-l 0. 
Also, general housekeeping can be important in the workplace. For example, a wood 
turning workshop would be expected to have a lot of wood shavings on the floor. If 
the housekeeping was to sweep the shavings into a metal bin with a lid every day 
there would be less risk of a fire starting than if the shavings were just swept into a 
pile in the corner once a week. The point being made here is that the general neatness 
and tidiness of a building can have on effect on the likelihood of fire and also the 
magnitude of existing hazards. This type of housekeeping practice is difficult to 
incorporate into this model. Therefore there will be no provision made for the general 
neatness of a building. 
5.4.2 Wedged Open Doors 
It is well known by those in the fire safety community that door wedges can make a 
big difference to the safety of a building. For this study a wedge is defined to mean 
any device used to hold a door open. Smoke stop doors are designed to stop the flow 
of smoke to other parts of a building. If these doors are wedged open in the event of 
a fire they can be the cause of smoke movement throughout a building. This can lead 
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to the unnecessary injury and death of occupants. An example of this is the New 
Empire Hotel Fire on the 4th February 1995. Smoke stop doors were wedged open 
at the time of the fire. This led to unnecessary smoke and fire spread throughout the 
top floors which caused multiple deaths. 
It is difficult to account for wedged open doors in this model. Wedged open doors 
increase the risk to life safety of a building significantly. The model could take this 
into account but the purpose of this model should be remembered. The purpose of 
this model is to assess the fire risks of buildings in terms of life safety. A very safe 
building can instantly become unsafe by putting a wedge under the doors. This is a 
management practice causing the safety of a building to be reduced. 
The objective ofthis model is to assess the fire risk ofbuildings in terms of life safety 
so the fire service can eventually allocate resources accordingly. Fire fighting 
resources should not be concentrated around buildings with poor management 
practices. It would be better to educate those using wedges possibly with the help of 
penalising those who do not comply. 
However it is felt that the wedging open of doors is a management practice which is 
known to increase the risk of fire and smoke spread significantly. Therefore there is a 
provision for wedged open doors in this model. This provision is shown in Table 5-
10. 
5.4.3 Evacuation Procedures 
This section is to allow for management practices which are in place which reduce the 
risk to life safety in a building. Provision is made here for an evacuation scheme 
existing in the building. An evacuation plan consisting of regular trial evacuations and 
training of occupants is considered to reduce the risk to life safety by giving them 
some preparation in emergency evacuation procedures. 
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Some buildings may have evacuation plans because they are required to in order to 
comply with fire safety regulations but may they not carry out regular trial 
evacuations. Regular trial· evacuations are considered to be valuable to the safety of 
the building occupants. They train the occupants to recognise the fire alarm and the 
correct procedures involved in egressing the building. This would therefore 
familiarise the occupants with the exits and the checking procedures involved. 
For the reasons outlined above the provision for evacuation procedures in this model 
is split up into two categories. The first one allows for whether or not a building has 
an evacuation procedure which has been approved by the fire service. The second 
allows for whether or not the occupants of the building participate in regular 
evacuation drills. These are shown in Table 5-10. 
5.4.4 Staff Training 
Staff training involves the training of staff in emergency procedures. This can involve 
training of building occupants to become floor wardens who check that all occupants 
are moving out of a building in an emergency evacuation. Also the training of the 
occupants of the procedures involved when a fire alarm is raised. If the building 
occupants are trained in how to act in the event of a fire alarm then there is less 
likelihood of panic or confusion. For this reason it is felt that the fire risk to 
occupants in terms of life safety is reduced by having staff training of emergency 
procedures. This is covered in Table 5-10 which takes staff training into account. 
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Management Practices 
House Are there obstacles or obstructions in corridors or exitways such Yes 
Keeping that occupants could be significantly impeded or delayed during No 
an emergency evacuation? 
Wedges Have fire doors or smoke stop doors been held or wedged open Yes 
such that fire or smoke could spread to other parts of the No 
building? 
Evac Is there an evacuation procedure in place which is approved by Yes 
Procedure the Fire Service? No 
Trial Evacs Are trial evacuation procedures regularly updated and Yes 
evacuation drills carried out on a regular basis? No 
Training Are staff or occupants of the building trained in emergency and Yes 
evacuation procedures? No 
Table 5-10 Allowance for Management Practices 
5.5 Protection 
5.5.1 Sprinkler Systems 
Sprinkler systems are extremely effective at reducing the fire risk within a building. 
While they do not reduce the likelihood of a fire starting, they actively help to control 
a fire. Research shows that there have been very few injuries or deaths in sprinklered 
buildings compared with unsprinklered buildings. To date there has only been one 
death in a sprinklered building (Narayanan & Whiting, 1996). 
Sprinklers both detect the fire in most cases and control the fire also. This prevents 
the fire from spreading and hence producing more lethal smoke. Therefore sprinklers 
have a great reducing effect on the fire risk to life safety within a building. In this 
model provision will be made for sprinklers being present in a building and will have a 
high reducing effect on the risk because they are considered the most effective 
protection feature. 
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Other automatic fire controlling systems such as foam or gas dispensing systems are 
to be considered as having a similar effect as sprinklers. This is because they serve the 
purpose of activating automatically in the event of a fire and attempt to control the 
fire. Other automatic systems which control the fire which are present are to be 
considered as sprinkler systems for this model as they reduce the fire risk to life safety 
significantly. 
Allowance for sprinklers is shown in Table 5-11. 
Presence of Sprinklers Result 
Are sprinklers or other automatic extinguishing devices Yes Good 
present throughout the building? No Bad 
Table 5-11 Allowance for Sprinklers 
5.5.2 Smoke Alarms 
Smoke alarms are effective in providing early detection of fire or smouldering. They 
are most effective in sleeping occupancies where occupants are alerted in the early 
stages of the fire rather than being woken by noise or smoke from the fire. The extra 
time provided by the early warning from smoke alarms can be critical in saving lives. 
A study by J.R Hall (Hall, 1996) states that homes with smoke detectors have slightly 
more than half the risk that a death will occur if a fire occurs compared to homes 
without smoke detectors. "Or to put it another way, smoke detectors cut the risk of 
dying if a home fire occurs by 40-50%." 
Out of the homes that have smoke detectors, 20% of them have smoke detectors 
which do not work due to batteries missing, dead batteries or disconnected batteries. 
(Hall 1996) So even if an occupancy has smoke detectors, they may not necessarily 
work. This is difficult to take into account in this model because a smoke detector 
may be functioning correctly at the time a building is assessed. The batteries may then 
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be removed or may not be renewed at a later date causing the detector to become 
useless. 
Smoke detectors that are hard wired, ie., powered by the mains power supply, are 
considered to have the same benefits as battery powered detectors. They are likely to 
be operational at all times unless there is a fire at the time of a power shortage. 
Smoke detectors which are hard wired will be incorporated into this model the same 
way as battery powered detectors. 
There is less information available on buildings with smoke detectors in which the 
occupants are not sleeping in terms of the reduced risk. Smoke detectors in these 
buildings would give early warning of fire enabling the occupants to try and extinguish 
it or to escape. This early warning to the fire is still considered very important and 
valuable even in buildings where occupants do not sleep. 
Buildings with smoke detectors present are considered as being at a significantly 
lower risk than those without for this model. They are not weighted as highly as 
sprinklers because they do not control the fire, however they are weighted higher than 
heat detectors because of the early warning provided. The issue of smoke detectors 
being present but not working due to batteries dead or missing is not taken into 
account in this model. 
Allowance for smoke alarms is shown in Table 5-12. 
Presence of Smoke Alarms Result 
Are smoke alarms present throughout the building which Yes Good 
are in good working order? No Bad 
Table 5-12 Allowance for Smoke Alarms 
5.5.3 Heat Detectors 
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If only heat detectors are present, the fire is detected but not controlled as in the 
presence of sprinklers. The signature of the fire they detect is its heat. This usually 
means that the fire is significantly developing at the time of detection. In other words 
the warning signal is informing occupants that there is a smoke producing fire already 
established in the building which is continuing to grow. The time available for 
occupants to try to extinguish the fire or escape is often much lower than the time 
available in a building with smoke detectors. A building with smoke detectors 
however detects the smoke of a fire in the early stages of growth. This gives the 
occupants more time to extinguish the fire or escape. 
For this model heat detectors are considered to reduce the fire risk of a building. This 
is because they detect the fire and warn occupants by way of audible alarm. This is 
especially important in sleeping occupancies. Heat detectors are not considered as 
effective as sprinklers or smoke detectors because they do not control the fire or give 
early warning to the occupants. 
Allowance for heat detectors is shown in Table 5-13. 
Presence of Heat Detectors Result 
Are heat detectors present throughout the building which Yes Good 
are in good working order? No Bad 
Table 5-13 Allowance for Heat Detectors 
5.5.4 Manual Call Points 
A building with manual call points as the only fire protection system is considered to 
be slightly less risk to life safety than a building with no fire protection at all. Manual 
call points allow occupants who discover a fire to raise the alarm by activating the call 
point. They do not however detect fire automatically. Therefore occupants who may 
be asleep or unaware of a fire in the building will not be alerted automatically. 
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Manual call points are considered to have some effect in reducing fire risk in terms of 
life safety. The weighting associated with them is less than sprinklers, smoke 
detectors and heat detectors. In the case of a building having a combination of 
manual call points and other detection systems, all will be taken into account and 
apply to the resultant risk value for the building. 
Allowance for manual call points is shown in Table 5-14. 
Presence of Manual Call Points Result 
Are manual call points present throughout the building Yes Good 
which are in good working order? No Bad 
Table 5-14 Allowance for Manual Call Points 
5.5.5 Brigade Connection 
Where a fire alarm system is connected to the Fire Service the fire risk to that building 
is considered to be reduced. The Fire Service can take between 5 and 20 minutes to 
arrive at the scene of a fire and in many cases the fatalities have occurred before they 
arnve. However there are also cases where building occupants are rescued by 
firefighters. This was the case at the New Empire Hotel Fire on the 4th February 
1995. At this fire, occupants were rescued from balconies by firefighters. Had they 
not been rescued they may well have added to the fatalities which occurred on that 
night. 
It is for these reasons that the presence of fire service connection reduces the risk 
associated with a building in this model. 
Allowance for a brigade connection is shown in Table 5-15. 
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Presence of Fire Service Connection Result 
Does the building have a wired connection to the fire Yes Good 
service? No Bad 
Table 5-15 Allowance for Brigade Connection 
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6. Assignment of Scores 
The tables in this chapter show the scores assigned to each of the factors which play a 
part in the model. These tables are all part of a final checksheet which is shown in the 
Appendix 1. The scores are combined using a combination of multiplication and 
addition in order to follow the definition of risk. The manipulation of the scores is 
shown in the next chapter. 
The scores assigned to the various factors are based on subjective judgement. The 
reasoning behind the importance of each one in terms of life safety has been explained 
in the previous chapter. The scores assigned have not yet been tested or verified. 
This would be the next step in the development of the model, however time did not 
allow this. 
6.1 Probability of Fire 
6.1.1 Probable Fire Severity 
The likelihood of ignition from Table 5-l in the previous section is combined with the 
fire growth rate from Table 5-2 to give a probable fire severity. The combination is in 
the form of a matrix. This effectively multiplies the score for the ignition likelihood 
with the score for the fire growth rate. This multiplication is used because the two 
factors involved are dependent variables. This means that both must happen at the 
same time for a fire to occur. ie., If something ignites but the fire does not grow then 
there is little hazard. For example, paper in a rubbish bin may ignite but if there is no 
other fuel to bum or the fuel has a very slow fire growth rate then the hazard would 
be less than if there was rapid burning fuel present. A rapid burning fuel would 
produce large volumes of smoke at a rapid rate and therefore would be more of a 
hazard. 
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On the other hand if there is fuel which is fast burning but there is little likelihood of 
ignition then the likelihood of a severe fire is low. The combination of ignition 
likelihood and fire growth rate of fuel available to obtain a probable fire severity is 
shown in along with the assigned scores. 
Growth 
Ignition Slow Medium Fast U. Fast 
Low 1 2 3 4 
Medium 2 3 4 5 
High 3 4 5 6 
Table 6-1 Probable Fire Severity. 
6.2 Occupants 
6.2.1 Number of Occupants 
The assigned values for the number of occupants are shown below m Error! 
Reference source not found .. 
Number of Occupants Occupant Category Score 
Upto2 Low 4 
3 to 5 Medium 6 
6 to 20 High 8 
Over 20 Extreme 10 
Table 6-2 Number of Occupants Scores 
The number of occupants in a building is to be taken as the number of people who 
would normally occupy the building or the firecell during its intended use. 
6.2.2 Aged, Immobile or Young Occupants 
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Aged, immobile and young occupants are accounted for in this model in Table 6-3. 
Aged, Disabled Occupants and Children Result Score 
Are aged, disabled or immobile persons or 
children present such that they would cause Yes (bad) 4 
significant delays in an emergency evacuation No (good) 0 
Table 6-3 Aged, Disabled Occupants and Children Scores. 
6.2.3 Sleeping Occupants 
Sleeping occupants are accounted for in this model in Table 6-4. 
Sleeping Occupants Result Score 
Is this building intended for sleeping purposes or Yes (bad) 4 
do the occupants of this building sleep here? No (good) 0 
Table 6-4 Sleeping Occupants Scores. 
6.3 Building 
6.3.1 Number of Stories 
The scores assigned to the various categories of the number of floors are shown in 
Table 6-5. 
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Number of Levels Hazard Category Score 
Single Level Low 0 
2 to 4 Levels, includes mezzanine floors Medium 3 
5 or more Levels High 5 
Table 6-5 Number of Levels Classifications. 
6.3.2 Exits 
The quality of exits of a building relates to their location, distribution and ease of use. 
With the help of Table 6-6 the user will assess the quality of the exits in the building. 
The assigned scores are shown as follows 
Exit Assessment Quality Score 
Do the occupants have and alternative means of Yes Good 0 
egress in a fire situation? 
No Bad 2 
Are there long or confusing exitways such that Yes Bad 2 
occupants would have difficulty escaping? 
No Good 0 
Does the building have a sufficient number of exits Yes Good 0 
for the size ofthe building and it's occupants? 
No Bad 2 
Table 6-6 Exit Quality Assessment. 
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The main question being answered by using the above table is, "Are the exits adequate 
for the safe and efficient egress of occupants during an emergency?" 
6.3.3 Fire and Smoke Spread 
The scores assigned for the fire and smoke spread features of a building are shown in 
Table 6-7. When completing this part of the model the user should keep in mind 
whether the risk to occupants' lives could be affected by the various features of the 
building. 
Smoke and Fire Spread Assessment Result Score 
Do concealed spaces exist such that fire or smoke spread Yes Bad 2 
could occur within the building in the event of a fire? 
If so, are they likely to significantly increase the risk to 
occupants' lives? 
No Good 0 
Do open shafts exist such that fire or smoke spread could Yes Bad 2 
occur within the building in the event of a fire? 
If so, are they likely to significantly increase the risk to 
occupants' lives? 
No Good 0 
Do holes or penetrations exist such that fire or smoke Yes Bad 2 
spread could occur within the building in the event of a 
fire? 
If so, are they likely to significantly increase the risk to 
occupants' lives? 
No Good 0 
Table 6-7 Smoke and Fire Spread Classifications. 
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6.3.4 Hazardous Substances 
The assigned score for the presence of hazardous substances that significantly increase 
the risk to life safety in the event of a fire is shown in Table 6-8. 
Presence of Hazardous Substances Score 
Are hazardous substances present in the building which Yes 3 
significantly increase the risk to life safety? No 0 
Table 6-8 Allowance for Hazardous Substances. 
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6.4 Management Practices 
The assigned scores for management practices are shown below in Table 6-9. 
Management Practices Score 
House Are there obstacles or obstructions in corridors or Yes 1 
Keeping exitways such that occupants could be significantly No 0 
impeded or delayed during an emergency evacuation? 
Wedges Have fire doors or smoke stop doors been held or Yes 4 
wedged open such that fire or smoke could spread to 
other parts of the building? No 0 
Evac Is there an evacuation procedure in place which is Yes -2 
Procedure approved by the Fire Service? No 0 
Trial Are trial evacuation procedures regularly updated and Yes -1 
Evacs evacuation drills carried out on a regular basis? No 0 
Training Are staff or occupants of the building trained in Yes -1 
emergency and evacuation procedures? No 0 
Table 6-9 Allowance for Management Practices. 
6.5 Protection 
6.5.1 Sprinkler Systems 
The provision for the presence of sprinklers within the building and the assigned score 
is shown in Table 6-10. 
Presence of Sprinklers Score 
Are sprinklers or other automatic extinguishing devices Yes -6 
present throughout the building? No 0 
Table 6-10 Allowance for Sprinklers. 
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6.5.2 Smoke Alarms 
The assigned score for the presence of smoke alarms in working order is shown in 
Table 6-11 
Presence of Smoke Alarms Score 
Are smoke alarms present throughout the building which Yes -4 
are in good working order? No 0 
Table 6-11 Allowance for Smoke Alarms. 
6.5.3 Heat Detectors 
The assigned score for the presence of heat detectors in working order is shown in 
Table 6-12 
Presence of Heat Detectors Score 
Are heat detectors present throughout the building which Yes -2 
are in good working order? No 0 
Table 6-12 Allowance for Heat Detectors. 
6.5.4 Manual Call Points 
The assigned score for the presence of manual call points in working order is shown 
in Table 6-13 
Presence of Manual Call Points Score 
Are manual call points present throughout the building Yes -2 
which are in good working order? No 0 
Table 6-13 Allowance for Manual Call Points. 
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6.5.5 Brigade Connection 
The assigned score for the presence of a wired connection to the Fire Service which is 
connected to the fire alarm panel is shown in Table 6-14 
Presence of Fire Service Connection Score 
Does the building have a wired connection to the fire Yes -2 
service? No 0 
Table 6-14 Allowance for Fire Service Connection. 
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7. Manipulation of Scores 
7. 1 Explanation 
This chapter shows how the scores which are obtained using the tables in the previous 
chapter are manipulated and combined to finally result in the risk value which 
represents the whole building. The number obtained for probable fire severity 
represents the likelihood of a severe fire occurring in the building. In the definition of 
risk, 
ie., Risk= probability x consequence, 
the probability component is represented here by the number obtained for the 
probable fire severity. 
The probable fire severity comes from Table 7-1. This is the exact same table as 
shown in the previous chapter. 
Growth 
Ignition Slow Medium Fast U. Fast 
Low 1 2 3 4 
Medium 2 3 4 5 
High 3 4 5 6 
Table 7-1 Probable Fire Severity 
The scores from the other tables which represent the consequences are combined 
using addition to obtain a number representing the overall consequences associated 
with a building as the result of a fire. Finally the two numbers, the probability value 
and the consequence value are multiplied together to result in a final number which 
represents the total fire risk of the building in terms oflife safety. 
56 
For example, if the value for probable fire severity is 4 and the total value for the 
consequences associated with a building is 6, then 4 multiplied by 6 is 24. For this 
example building, the risk to life safety is 24. This number is a non dimensional 
number which, when compared with other building risk values gives the risk of the 
building relative to other buildings. 
7.2 Hazards and Consequences 
The scores associated with the hazards and consequences which are those relating to 
the occupants, the building, management practices and protection are all added to 
give a value representing the consequences of a fire in the building in terms of life 
safety. All the scores have been assigned to the various factors based ori their relative 
influence on the risk to life safety. The following list of tables is part of the final 
checksheet. It is shown here to help explain the way the numbers are added for each 
of the building hazards. 
Occupants 
Number of Occupants 
No. Occu_pants Category Score 
0 to 2 Low 4 
3 to 5 Medium 6 
6 to 20 Hi_g_h 8 
over 20 Extreme 10 
Score Used I a 
Aged, Immobile, Children 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used I b 
Sleeping Occupants 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used I c 
Building 
No. Stories 
No. Stories 
1 
2 to 4 
over 5 
Exit Quality 
Category Score 
Low 0 
Medium 3 
High 5 
Score Used 
Alternative Egress? 
Score 
Yes 0 
No 2 
Score Used 
Confusing Exits? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used 
Sufficient Exits? 
Score 
Yes 0 
No 2 
Score Used 
Fire and Smoke Spread 
Concealed Spaces? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used 
Open Shafts? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used 
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I d 
I e 
J f 
I g 
I h 
I 
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Holes or Penetrations? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used J j 
Hazardous Substances 
Present? 
Score 
Yes 3 
No 0 
Score Used I k 
Management Practices 
Obstructions in Exitways? 
Score 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Score Used J 
Wedges Under Doors? 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used I m 
Evacuation Procedure? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I n 
Trial Evacuations? 
Score 
Yes -1 
No 0 
Score Used I 0 
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Staff Training? 
Score 
Yes -1 
No 0 
Score Used I p 
Protection 
Sprinklers? 
Score 
Yes -6 
No 0 
Score Used I q 
Smoke Alarms? 
Score 
Yes -4 
No 0 
Score Used I r 
Heat Detectors? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I s 
Manual Call Points? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I t 
Brigade Connection? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I u 
Total Consequence Score= a+ b + c + d + e + f+ g + h + i + j + k + 1 + m + n + o + 
p+q+r+s+t+u= __ 
This total consequence score 1s the sum of the factors which relate to the 
consequences. 
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7.3 Final Risk Score 
The next step is to multiply the value obtained from Table 7-1 which is the probable 
fire severity by the total consequence score. This gives the risk score for the building. 
Risk= Prob Fire Severity x Consequences 
For example, ifthe score for the probable fire severity is 4 (from Table 7-1) and the 
total score for the consequences is 6 then the risk for the building is, 4 x 6 = 24. 
7.4 Meaning of Result 
The risk value obtained does not give an indication of whether the building is a high 
or low risk. This can only be determined by assessing other buildings and comparing 
the relative risk values for those buildings on a scale. Figure 7-1 shows a the idea of 
putting the assessed buildings on a relative scale in simple in a simplified fashion. 
Low 
DOD 
ODD 
rBBl ODD 
~ ~D=D=D=='~ 
Figure 7-1 Schematic of Fire Risk Scale 
High 
The results for the risk of buildings is not necessarily linear. A building with a risk 
value of 20 is not necessarily twice as much of a risk as a building with a score of 10. 
The scores assigned to each of the hazards are based on subjective judgement and 
they are simply added to give a number representing the consequences component of 
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the risk equation. It is impossible to combine such a variety of factors in a way such 
that the results can be compared linearly. The results are however useful in 
identifying which buildings stands out as the safest and those which are the highest 
risk. 
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8. Using the Model 
8. 1 Final Checksheet 
The final checksheet can be seen in Appendix 1. This is the checksheet that can be 
taken into buildings and filled out while assessing the building. An example of the 
model being used to assess a building is also shown in Appendix 1. 
8.2 Scope of Assessment 
Some buildings may have rooms in them which are of a particularly high risk to life 
safety compared to other parts of the building. For instance a warehouse may have 
very little combustible material in the majority of the usable space, but the offices may 
contain furniture and papers which would rapidly endanger lives in the event of a fire. 
The assessment should be carried out in the part of the building which would 
obviously give a higher risk. If there is doubt then assessments should be carried out 
on those areas of uncertainty separately and the higher resulting risk value taken as 
the risk for that building. 
Where a building is divided into firecells by fire resistant walls a separate assessment 
should be carried out for each firecell. 
8.3 Information Handling 
The handling of the results of each checksheet have not been dealt with in this project. 
One way of storing the results would be to have a database system on computer. This 
would store all the information on the checksheet and could be looked up at any time. 
Also extremely useful in this method of data handling is that if the values used in the 
model are changed at any time the database could be set up so that all the buildings 
that have been assessed already would be updated to the new values. 
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The results can be dealt with in a variety of ways by computer. One further step from 
the database system is the use of G.I.S (Geographic Information System). This is a 
database system with a special user interface. The location of an area can be shown 
on the computer screen as a map with the building sites marked. The user can click 
on a particular site and the information associated with that site shows up. The 
information could be the results of a risk assessment using this model. Various other 
data relating to that particular building can also be shown depending on how it is set 
up. This can be useful when incorporating risk assessments in terms of aspects other 
than life safety such as property protection, environmental impact and social impact. 
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9. Conclusions 
• A risk assessment model has been developed in the form of a checksheet using a 
risk ranking system to assess the fire risk ofbuildings in terms of life safety. 
• A simple points system has been used which assigns scores to various hazard and 
protection features of a building. These scores are then manipulated using addition 
and multiplication to arrive at an overall risk score for the building. 
• The final value which represents the risk of the building is obtained using the 
definition of risk where risk is equal to the product of the likelihood of a fire 
occurring and its consequences. 
• The proposed model which focuses on risk in terms of life safety can be extended 
to include property protection, environmental impact and social impact. 
• It was found that the influences that human behaviour has on the fire risk within a 
building are significant and very difficult to quantify. 
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1 0. Future Research 
10.1 Testing of Model 
The next stage of the development of this model is to test it. This means that the 
model should be applied to a variety of buildings and the results analysed. In order to 
test the model it would have to be applied in situations such as the following. 
1. Test the model on various buildings of the same nature and compare the results. 
2. Test the model on various types of buildings and compare the results 
3. Have various different people test the model on the same buildings and compare 
the results. 
4. Compare the results of this model to the results using other existing models. 
5. Compare the results ofthe model to statistics on fires in buildings. 
6. Compare the results of the model to the assessment of the risk of buildings by 
personal judgement. 
The results of testing the model would hopefully help to identify which areas need 
further development. 
10.2 Other Aspects of Risk 
There are many parts of this project that should be studied in further detail so as to 
improve the accuracy of assessing the fire risk in a building. 
10.2.1 Property Protection 
The fire risk of a building in terms of property protection could be assessed using 
similar techniques as those used in this model. There would be more emphasis on the 
building materials and the fuel load within the building. This aspect of risk assessment 
would be of interest to the insurance industry for the assessment of premiums based 
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on the fire risk to property. It is an area which could be studied in detail as a future 
research project. 
1 0.2.2 Environmental Impact 
The potential environmental impact of a fire is a complex issue which cannot be 
covered as part of this project. The effects of toxic smoke on the immediate 
environment and the environment on a global scale is very difficult to quantify. Also 
the toxic runoff from water being applied to a fire into nearby streams, waterways or 
into the soil also has some impact which is also difficult to deal with. In future the 
threat to the environment as the result of a fire in a building should be studied and 
eventually incorporated in a risk assessment model. 
10.2.3 Social Impact 
The social impact of a fire in a building is also a complex issue and can vary greatly 
depending on a local society. The loss of a major building in a small community may 
have a greater impact on society than a similar building in a large city. This type of 
impact from a fire is difficult to quantify. Future research could involve looking at 
what features in and around a building reduce and enhance the fire risk when viewed 
in terms of social impact. 
10.2.4 Other Areas 
There are many other aspects of this model that could be further studied and their 
results incorporated into this risk assessment model in the future. These include the 
detailed effects of sleeping people on life safety versus those awake, the possibility of 
protection features failing, the effect of disabled and aged people on life safety and 
many more aspects. These future studies all have the potential to extend into sizeable 
projects and will all lead to the greater understanding of the risks faced when dealing 
with the effects of fire. 
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10.3 Verification of Scores 
In future the variables assigned to the risk assessment model can be continuously 
revised and improved. This can be achieved using a panel of experts as previously 
mentioned, and using probabilistic methods. As more data becomes available in the 
future it will be possible to improve the accuracy of risk assessment even more. 
10.3.1 Delphi Panel 
One effective way of verifYing the scores used in this model would be to use a Delphi 
panel. This would consist of a panel of people who are experts in fire safety and fire 
engineering. The panel of people would work through the model and the values 
assigned to the features of buildings. Firstly the individual members of the panel try 
to verify the scores using their reasoning and judgement along with the information 
given in this report. They then try and verify the scores used. The results of each 
individual are compared and discussion raised. 
The panel then continues to verify the scores until a consensus is reached. The panel 
of experts try and agree on suitable numbers to be used in the model. This method is 
still a subjective judgement method but usually more accurate than the opinions and 
reasoning of just one person. The various members of the panel would all have 
different views on the issues incorporated in the model. These can be shared with the 
other members to try and cover all the issues relevant in verifYing the numbers. 
10.3.2 Fire Statistics 
The subjectivity of the values used in this model could be further improved using fire 
statistics. There is a relatively small amount of data recorded on fire statistics in New 
Zealand compared with other countries. As more New Zealand data becomes 
available it can be incorporated into this model using probabilistic methods. 
70 
New Zealand and Australia are quite similar in the nature of their buildings. A 
possibility would be to use statistical fire data recorded in Australia to increase the 
database with which to work with to enhance the accuracy of the results obtained 
using this model. 
71 
References 
Bryan, J.L; Behavioural Response to Fire and Smoke; 1995; Ch 3-12, SFPE 
Handbook of Fire Protection 
Association. 
Engineering, 2nd Ed; National Fire Protection 
Boult, M & Pitblado, R; The Control of Hazardous Installations Using Quantitative 
Risk Assessment; Fire Engineers Journal, Vol 56 No.180 January 1996, pp 39-45 
Dowling, D.M; Action in the Event of Fire: Human Behaviour-A Fire Fighter's View; 
Fire Engineers Journal, Vol 54 No.173 June 1994, pp 20-24 
Gillett, J.P; Rapid Fire Risk Assessment; Fire Safety Engineering Journal, Volume 1, 
Number 6, December 1994, pp18-21 
Hall, J.R; U.S. Experience With Smoke Detectors and Other Fire Detectors; 1996; 
National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. 
Klein, R; Risk Assessment - An Exercise in Applied Common Sense; Fire Engineers 
Journal, Vol 56 No.180 January 1996, pp31-35. 
Nayaranan, P; Definition of Risk Management Terminologies; 1996; New Zealand 
Fire Service 
Narayanan, P; Effectiveness of Smoke Management Systems; 1996; Study Report No 
66; Building Research Association ofNew Zealand, Judgeford. 
Narayanan, P & Whiting, P; New Zealand Fire Risk Data; 1996; Study Report No 64; 
Building Research Association ofNew Zealand, Judgeford. 
72 
NSWFB, Category 1 Hazard Sheet; New South Wales Fire Brigade Risk Mapping 
Classification System; Undated. 
NSWFB Operations Research Unit; Hazard or Risk?; New South Wales Fire Brigade 
Risk Mapping Classification System; Undated. 
Shields, T.J; Fire and Disabled People in Buildings; Fire Engineers Journal, Vol 55 
No.176 March 1995, pp 28-31 
Watts, J.M; Fire Risk Ranking; 1995; Ch 5-2, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection 
Engineering, 2nd Ed; National Fire Protection Association. 
Appendix 1 
Australian Risk Model Checksheets 
New Risk Assessment Model Checksheet 
Example 
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Building Fire Risk Assessment Checksheet 
Admin Details 
Date 
--------------Risk Score. ____ _ 
Fire Station 
Building Name 
Address 
Fire Severity, Y 
Growth 
Ignition Low Medium 
Low 1 2 
Medium 2 3 
High 3 4 
Occupants 
N b fO ts urn ero ccuoan 
No. Occupants Category 
0 to 2 Low 
3 to 5 Medium 
6 to20 High 
over 20 Extreme 
Fast U. Fast 
3 4 
4 5 
5 6 
Score Used 
Score 
4 
6 
8 
10 
Score Used 
Aged. Immobile, Children 
Sleeping Occupants 
Building 
No Stories 
No. Stories 
1 
2 to4 
over 5 
Exit Quality 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used 
Category Score 
Low 0 
Medium 3 
High 5 
Score Used 
A1 E ternative ~gress? 
Score 
Yes 0 
No 2 
Score Used 
I 
I a 
I b 
I c 
I d 
I e 
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Confusing Exits? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used I f 
Sufficient Exits? 
Score 
Yes 0 
No 2 
Score Used I g 
Fire and Smoke Spread 
C ealdS ? one e spaces.
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used I h 
Open Shafts? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used I 
Holes or Penetrations? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used I 
Hazardous Substances 
Present? 
Score 
Yes 3 
No 0 
Score Used I k 
Management Practices 
Ob . E. ? structwns m XItwa s. 
Score 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Score Used l 
Wedges Under Doors? 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used I m 
Evacuation Procedure? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I n 
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Trial Evacuations? 
Score 
Yes -I 
No 0 
Score Used I 0 
StaffT . . ? rauung-. 
Score 
Yes -1 
No 0 
Score Used I p 
Protection 
Sprinklers? 
Score 
Yes -6 
No 0 
Score Used I q 
Smoke Alarms? 
Score 
Yes -4 
No 0 
Score Used I r 
Heat Detectors? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I s 
Manual Call Points? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I 
Brigade Connection? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used I u 
!Probable Fire Severity, Y = 
Total Consequence Score, Z = a+ b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i + j + k + 1 
+m+n+o+p+q+r+s+t+u= 
Risk, X - Y x Z = X 
THE LibRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBUR'i 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z. 
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Example 
An example of the application of the model is presented here to illustrate its use. 
Consider a building which is a 3 storey office block. 
There are heaters and computers in the offices and loose papers, foam stuffed 
furniture, curtains etc also. 
The building contains 40 people, none ofwhich sleep in the offices. 
There are no aged or disabled occupants and no children. 
The exits are of good quality however there are boxes and other office equipment 
stacked in some of the exitways. 
There are no concealed spaces, holes or penetrations or shafts which smoke would be 
likely to travel through. 
There are no hazardous substances stored. 
There is an evacuation plan in place but almost all of the staff have no idea it exists, 
nor have they had any training in evacuation of that building. 
The protection system consists of sprinklers, manual call points and a brigade 
connection. 
There are no wedges under the smoke stop doors. 
The checksheet and risk for this example building is shown as follows. 
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Building Fire Risk Assessment Checksheet - Example 
Admin Details 
Date 
-------'2""'5""'/2"'"'/9"'"'7-______ Risk Score __ .....:1:..:6'---
Sock bum Fire Station 
Building Name 
Address 
Bareback & Co Ltd 
Christchurch NZ 
Fire Severity, Y 
Growth 
Ignition Low Medium Fast U. Fast 
Low 1 2 3 4 
Medium 2 3 4 5 
High 3 4 5 6 
Score Used 
Occupants 
N b fO urn ero ccupants 
No. Occupants Category Score 
0 to 2 Low 4 
3 to 5 Medium 6 
6 to 20 High 8 
over 20 Extreme 10 
Score Used 
Aged. Immobile. Children 
Sleeping Occupants 
Building 
No Stories 
No. Stories 
1 
2 to4 
over 5 
Exit Quality 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used 
Category Score 
Low 0 
Medium 3 
High 5 
Score Used 
Alt tiE? erna ve ~gress. 
Score 
Yes 0 
No 2 
Score Used 
4 I 
10 I a 
0 I b 
0 I c 
3 I d 
0 I e 
medium ignition, fast growth 
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Confusing Exits? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I f 
Sufficient Exits? 
Score 
Yes 0 
No 2 
Score Used 0 I g 
Fire and Smoke Spread 
c al d s ? once e )paces. 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used 0 J h 
Open Shafts? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I 
Holes or Penetrations? 
Score 
Yes 2 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I 
Hazardous Substances 
Present? 
Score 
Yes 3 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I k 
Management Practices 
Ob tru ti . E 'tw ? s c onsm Xl a s. 
Score 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Score Used 1 I 
Wedges Under Doors? 
Score 
Yes 4 
No 0 
Score Used 0 J m 
Evacuation Procedure? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I n 
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Trial Evacuations? 
Score 
Yes -1 
No 0 
Score Used 0 ! 0 
s taff Trammg? 
Score 
Yes -1 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I p 
Protection 
Sprinklers? 
Score 
Yes -6 
No 0 
Score Used -6 I q 
Smoke Alarms? 
Score 
Yes -4 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I r 
Heat Detectors? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used 0 I s 
Manual Call Points? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used -2 I 
Brigade Connection? 
Score 
Yes -2 
No 0 
Score Used -2 u 
!Probable Fire Severity, Y = 4 
Total Consequence Score, Z = a + b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i + j + k + 1 
+m+n+o+p+q+r+s+t+u= 4 
Risk, X - Y x Z = 4 X 4 - 16 
95/1 
95/2 
95/3 
95/4 
95/5 
96/1 
96/2 
96/3 
96/4 
96/5 
96/6 
97/1 
97/2 
97/3 
97/4 
97/5 
97/6 
97/7 
97/8 
FIRE ENGINEERING RESEARCH REPORTS 
Full Residential Scale Backdraft 
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Walls for Fire Resistance 
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Experiments 
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Improving the Waking Effectiveness of Fire 
Alarms in Residential Areas 
Study of Evacuation Movement through 
Different Building Components 
Domestic Fire Hazarrf in New Zealand 
An Appraisal of Existing Room-Corner Fire 
Models 
Fire Resistance of Light Timber Framed Walls 
and Floors 
Uncertainty Analysis of Zone Fire Models 
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